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In this paper, we quantify welfare costs of inflation for Pakistan for the period 1960-2007 
using semi-log and double-log money demand functions. We find that the welfare gain of 
moving from  positive inflation to zero inflation is approximately the same under both money 
demand specifications but the behaviour of the two models is fairly different towards low 
interest rates. Moving from zero inflation to zero nominal interest rate has a substantial gain 
under double-log form compared to the semi-log function. The compensating variation 
approach for the semi-log model gives higher welfare loss figures compared to Bailey’s 
approach. However, the two approaches yield approximately the same welfare cost of inflation 
for the double-log specification. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Inflation generally defined as sustained increase in price levels is viewed as having 
widespread implications for an economy on different accounts. It creates several economic 
distortions which stifle government’s efforts to achieve macroeconomic objectives. In 
principle, price stability is considered a necessary condition for lessening income fidgets and 
disparities. Several studies provide empirical evidence that growth declines sharply during a 
high inflation crisis [see, for example, Bruno and Easterly (1996)].  Since high inflation 
creates uncertainty, distorts investment plans and priorities, and reduces the real return on 
financial assets, it discourages savings, and hence affects growth negatively. Moreover, high 
inflation adversely affects economic efficiency by distorting market signals. All these costs 
are associated with unanticipated inflation and have received considerable attention in the 
literature. Most of these costs involve transfer of resources from one group to another and the 
losses and gains tend to offset each other. However, it is widely agreed that most of the 
unexpected inflation-related costs can be avoided if inflation is correctly anticipated. Though 
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inflation, even when fully anticipated, results in loss to society in terms of  net loss of valuable 
services of real money balances. 
Under an inflationary environment, people anticipate inflation and accordingly 
adjust the ratio of real balances to income to the opportunity cost of holding money.1 
Since, there is no close substitute for real balances, and since an unavoidable cost of 
holding money is its opportunity cost, i.e., the nominal interest rate, the nominal rates 
reflect the expected inflation. So, according to the Fisher hypothesis, the cost of holding 
real balances increases with an increase in anticipated inflation.  
Beginning with Bailey (1956), the welfare cost of inflationary finance is treated as 
the deadweight loss of inflation tax, which is calculated by integrating the area under the 
money demand curve (Harberger Triangle). Traditional analyses of welfare costs of 
inflation have emphasised that these costs depend on the form of money demand function 
[see, for example, Bailey (1956)]. Models based on a Cagan-type semi-logarithmic 
demand and double-log money demand functions have extensively been employed in the 
literature for calculating the welfare cost of inflation. The two different types of demand 
specifications are very likely to give different estimates of welfare cost. This difference 
mainly exists due to the behaviour of the two demand curves towards low inflation [see, 
for details, Lucas (2000)].  
Empirical literature on the welfare cost of inflation suggests that money stock 
should be defined in the narrowest form representing the true liquidity services provided 
to society. More precisely, the money stock should be taken in its narrow form as 
monetary base and M1. In some of the cases M1 tends to overstate the welfare cost 
because when it is treated as a single aggregate (currency only) welfare integral it runs 
from zero to the positive nominal interest rate. Therefore, to accommodate for the interest 
bearing demand deposits component of M1, recent studies calculate welfare costs in the 
currency-deposit framework.2 
Traditional studies on hyperinflation countries estimated the welfare cost of 
inflation against Friedman’s deflation rate as under hyperinflation the real interest rate 
was zero and the deflation rule implied zero inflation. However, in applying this method 
to a relatively developed country with stable prices and positive real interest rates, 
researchers evaluate the welfare cost of positive inflation against both zero inflation and 
deflation policies. All these issues—the formulation of a monetary model, definition of 
monetary aggregates, and optimal inflation and interest rate policies, are equally 
important areas of inquiry.  
Empirical studies on inflation in Pakistan have mainly focused on exploring the 
significant derivers of inflation [see, for example, Qayyum (2006), Khan and 
Schimmelpfenning (2006), Kemal (2006) and Khan, et al. (2007)].  A general consensus 
of these studies is that monetary factors have played a dominant role in recent inflation. 
Moreover, some of the studies have emphasised the role of SBP in implementing an 
independent monetary policy with the objective of attaining price stability.3 The present 
 
1Inflation resulting from this process imposes a tax on cash balances and a loss in terms of non-optimal 
holding of money. 
2Distinct role of currency and deposits is emphasised in Marty (1999), Bali (2000), and Simonsen and 
Rubens (2001). 
3See, for example, Hussain (2005), Mubarik (2005), and Khan and Schimmelpfenning (2006) giving 
some threshold levels of inflation. 
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authors have not been able to find even a single study assessing the cost borne by  society 
due to positive inflation in Pakistan.  
Given this background, this paper attempts to comprehensively investigate the welfare 
cost of inflation for Pakistan. Thus, this study endeavours to bridge the gap in empirical 
literature on inflation in Pakistan. We use time-series data over the period 1960 to 2007 for 
monetary aggregates, namely, the monetary base, M1, currency and demand deposits, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and nominal interest rates, to estimate both semi-log and double log 
(aka log-log and log-lin, respectively) money demand functions. Our paper is also very 
different from the existing literature on money demand function with regard to the estimation 
technique used in earlier studies.4  Specifically, we employed the autoregressive distributed 
lag model (ARDL) developed by Pesaran, et al. (2001) in our empirical estimation. The major 
advantage of ARDL modelling is that it does not require any precise identification of the order 
of integration of the underlying series. In addition to that, this technique is applicable even if 
the explanatory variables are endogenous.  
After estimating the parameters of the long-run demand functions for narrow 
money, we assess the welfare losses associated with different rates of inflation 
quantitatively. By computing and comparing the welfare loss across different money 
demand specifications and monetary aggregates we address the issue of reducing 
inflation to zero and further reducing it to Friedman’s deflation rule.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
welfare cost of inflation and money demand function in Pakistan. Section 3 explains the 
theoretical model specifications, describes the estimation technique, discusses the data 
used in our analysis, and presents the definition of the variables included in our empirical 
models. Section 4 reports the estimation results and the welfare cost calculations based on 
the estimated models, while Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we provide a brief review of prior empirical studies on the 
estimation of welfare cost of inflation. We also review the literature related money 
demand functions as the welfare cost of inflation crucially depends on the behaviour of 
money demand function.  
 
(a)  The Welfare Cost of Inflation 
The issue of welfare cost of inflation is addressed under both partial equilibrium 
(traditional) and general equilibrium (neo-classical) frameworks. Bailey (1956) is the first 
to study the welfare implications of public sector inflationary finance. He shows that 
open (anticipated) inflation costs members of society more than the revenue, which 
accrues to the government. The dead weight loss associated with this implicit tax is the 
difference between the cost to the money holders and the transfer to the government. 
Inflation acts like an excise tax on money holding and the dead weight loss of anticipated 
(open) inflation is the welfare cost of inflation.  
Reviewing the literature, we find that the neoclassical non-monetary models have 
been extended in three ways to allow for a role of money: (i) Money-in-the-Utility 
 
4
 See Section 2 on Pakistan-specific literature on the empirical estimation of money demand functions.    
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Function model (MIU), directly yields utility and is treated like a consumer good 
[Sidrauski (1967)], (ii) in the Cash-in-Advance model (CIA), some transactions require 
cash and transactions or illiquidity costs create demand for money [Clower (1967); 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)], and (iii) the Overlapping Generation model where money is 
used for the intertemporal transfer of wealth [Samuelson (1958)]. 
The welfare cost of inflation in its magnitude depends on the benchmark inflation 
rate. That is, what should be the desirable or optimal rate of inflation? Optimal inflation 
rate in some of the studies is taken as zero-inflation or price stability and in others as the 
Friedman’s deflation rate. Bailey (1956) measuring welfare cost of inflation for 
hyperinflation countries uses zero-inflation rate as the benchmark, which was also 
equivalent to Friedman’s deflation rule because in hyperinflation the real rate of interest 
is zero.  
However, later studies show that the welfare loss function is lowest when 
Friedman’s optimal deflation rule is applied [Friedman (1969); Barro (1972) and Lucas 
(2000)]. Friedman’s deflation rule is based on Pareto optimality condition where the 
socially efficient level of production of a commodity is the one where marginal cost is 
equal to marginal benefit (later being the price of the commodity). The marginal cost of 
producing money is nearly zero for the monetary authority but the social cost is the 
nominal interest rate, the opportunity cost of holding cash. To minimise the cost of 
holding money, the nominal interest rate should be brought to zero, which requires 
deflation equal to the real interest rate.  
The traditional partial equilibrium model does not take into account the fact that 
the receipts from inflation tax can be used for the production of government capital and 
can contribute to economic growth. This aspect of inflationary finance was developed by 
Mundell (1965) and was later extended in Marty (1967) in the welfare costs of inflation 
context. Marty (1967) using Cagan’s and Mundell’s money demand specifications for 
Hungary shows that the traditional measure of welfare is close to the measure of welfare 
cost in the model where inflation induces growth. The welfare cost of 10 percent inflation 
is 0.1 percent of income and 15.84 percent of government budget.  
Welfare cost estimates of Bailey (1956) and Marty (1967) are based on the 
average cost of revenue collection through money creation but Tower (1971) measures it 
as a marginal cost. Specifically in Tower (1971), for a hypothetical economy, “Sylvania”, 
the average and marginal costs are compared. The rate of inflation at which the average 
cost of inflationary finance is 7 percent corresponds to the marginal cost of 15 percent. 
Anticipated inflation raises the transaction costs as the individuals raise the 
frequency of transactions which results in increased velocity of money [Bailey (1956)]. 
However, another cost of inflation arises when individuals facing high inflation employ 
alternative payments media with higher transaction costs. Barro (1972) is the first to 
identify the role of substitute transaction media. Using the partial equilibrium model for 
Hungary, the welfare costs of high, hyperinflation and unstable hyperinflation are 
calibrated. He finds that the welfare cost of 2-5 percent monthly inflation rate is between 
3-75 percent. He also shows that welfare cost increases sharply for the inflation rate 
above 5 percent per month.  
Fisher (1981) studies the distortionary costs of moderate inflation and applies the 
partial equilibrium analysis to the US economy. The welfare loss is measured by the 
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consumer surplus measure that incorporates the production and taxation through portfolio 
choice decision. Using high-powered money as the monetary asset, the welfare loss of 10 
percent inflation is estimated to be about 0.3 percent of GNP. Using Bailey’s (1956) 
consumer surplus formula, Lucas (1981) calculated welfare cost of inflation for the US, 
defining money as M1. The welfare gain is estimated to be 0.45 percent of GNP as the 
economy moves from 10 percent inflation to zero inflation.  
Cooley and Hansen (1989) estimate the costs of anticipated inflation in a real 
business model where money demand arises from cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. In 
this model, anticipated inflation operates as inflation tax on activities involving cash 
(consumption) and individuals tend to substitute non-cash activities (leisure) for cash 
activities. The welfare cost is measured as a reduction in consumption as a percentage to 
GNP. Using quarterly data of US over the period from 1955:3 to 1984:1 for 
macroeconomic aggregates and using parameters of microeconomic data studies, the 
model is calibrated. The simulation results show that the estimates of welfare loss are 
sensitive to the definition of money balances and to the length of time households are 
constrained to hold cash. For a moderate annual inflation rate of 10 percent, the welfare 
loss is about 0.39 percent of GNP where money is taken as M1 and the individual holds 
cash for one quarter. But this cost is substantially reduced to 0.1 percent for the monetary 
base and further when the individual is constrained to hold cash for one month.  
Extending Cooley and Hansen (1989) CIA model, the revenue and welfare 
implications of different taxes are analysed in Cooley and Hansen (1991). Using 
calibration and simulation techniques they show that the presence of distortionary taxes 
(taxes on capital and labour) doubles the welfare cost of a given steady-state inflation 
policy. A permanent zero-inflation policy with other distortionary taxes held at their 
benchmark level improves welfare by 0.33 percent of GNP. In another type of zero-
inflation policy that is assumed to be permanent, and where the lost revenue from 
inflation tax is replaced by raising distortionary taxes, the welfare cost is higher than the 
original policy with 5 percent inflation. Moreover, a temporary reduction of inflation rate 
to zero makes the economy worse-off due to inter-temporal substitutions. 
Cooley and Hansen (1989) measure the welfare cost under the assumption of cash 
only economy. However, in Cooley and Hansen (1991), the availability of costless credit 
is taken into account. Gillman (1993) introducing the Baumol (1952) exchange margin 
allows the consumer to decide to purchase goods for cash or credit with further 
assumption of costly credit. Consumers, while making a decision, weigh the time cost of 
credit against the opportunity cost of cash. The interest rate elasticity and welfare loss 
from a costly credit set-up is compared with the cash-only and costless credit economies. 
Using US average annual data from 1948 to 1988, the authors show that both interest 
elasticity and welfare cost in costly credit economies are greater than the cash-only and 
costless credit settings. The cost associated with 10 percent inflation is 2.19 percent of 
income compared to 0.58 percent and 0.10 percent for cash-only and costless credit 
economies respectively.  
Eckstein and Leiderman (1992) in addition to Cagan semi-log model use 
Sidrauski-type money-in-utility (MIU) model to study seigniorage implications and 
welfare cost of inflation for Israel. The parameters of the intertemporal MIU model are 
estimated by using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), on quarterly data from 
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1970:I to 1988:III. The simulation results show that inflation rate of 10 percent has 
welfare loss of about 1 percent of GNP. The degree of risk aversion is identified as an 
important determinant of welfare cost and loss of lower inflation rates predicted by the 
inter-temporal model which is higher than that calculated from the Cagan-type model. 
The welfare cost estimates from the inter-temporal model are more reliable as it produced 
national income ratios and seigniorage ratios much closer to the actual values. 
Lόpez (2000) following Eckstein and Leiderman (1992) inter-temporal model 
studies the seigniorage behaviour and welfare consequences of different inflation rates in 
Columbia. For the period 1977:II to 1997:IV the parameters of the model are estimated 
using GMM. Welfare loss due to increase in inflation from 5 percent to 20 percent is 2.3 
percent of GDP, and 1 percent of GDP when inflation increases from 10 percent to 20 
percent. Eckstein and Leiderman’s (1992) model with some modifications is employed in 
Samimi and Omran (2005) to study the consumption and money demand behaviour from 
inter-temporal choice. The welfare cost of inflation is calculated using annual data from 
1970 to 2000 for Iran. Welfare cost is found to be positively related to the inflation rate. 
While the welfare cost of 10  percent inflation is 2 percent of GDP, the cost is 4.37 
percent of GDP for an inflation rate of 50 percent.  
Several studies, including Bailey (1956), Wolman (1997), and Eckstein and 
Leiderman (1992), have pointed out that the estimates of welfare cost depend largely on 
the money demand specification. Lucas (1994, 2000) estimates the double log money 
demand function in explaining the actual scatter plot than the semi-log functional form 
for the period 1900-1994. Bailey’s consumer’s surplus formulae are derived and used to 
compute the welfare cost of inflation for both semi-log and log-log money demand 
functions. Based on the log-log demand curve, the welfare gain from moving from 3 
percent to zero interest rate is about 0.01 percent of real GDP, while for semi-log 
estimates it is less than 0.001 percent.  
Simonsen and Rubens (2001) theoretically extended Lucas (2000) transactions 
technology model to allow for the interest bearing assets. Simonsen and Rubens (2001) 
reach the conclusion that with interest earning assets included, the upper bound lies 
between Bailey’s consumer surplus measure and Lucas’ measure of welfare cost. Bali 
(2000) using different monetary aggregates calculated welfare cost using two approaches, 
Bailey’s welfare cost measure and the compensating variation approach. Error correction 
and partial adjustment models are applied to find the long interest elasticities and semi-
elasticities. For the quarterly data ranging from 1957:I to 1997:II, the empirical results 
show that constant elasticity demand function accurately fits the actual US data. The loss 
to welfare associated with 4 percent inflation turned out to be 0.29 percent of income 
(benchmark to be zero nominal interest rate) and the welfare gain in moving from 4 
percent to zero inflation is 0.11 percent of income with currency-deposit specification, 
while welfare cost is around 0.18 percent of GDP when monetary base is used whereas 
with M1 the loss is much higher than the earlier two cases (approximately 0.55 percent of 
GDP). 
Serletis and Yavari (2003) calculate and compare the welfare cost of inflation for 
two North American economies, namely Canada and the United States, for the period 
1948 to 2000. Following Lucas (2000), they assume a constant interest elasticity of 
money demand function. They show 0.22 interest rate elasticity for Canada, while 0.21 
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for the USA, much lower than 0.5 assumed by Lucas (2000). Welfare cost is measured 
using the traditional Bailey’s approach and Lucas’ compensating variation approach. The 
welfare gain of interest rate reduction from 14 percent to 3 percent (consistent with zero 
inflation) for the US is equivalent to 0.45 percent increase in income. Reducing the 
nominal interest rate further to the optimal deflation rate yields an increase in income by 
0.18 percent. For Canada, the distortionary costs are marginally lower, reducing the rate 
of interest from 14 percent to 3 percent increases the real income by 0.35 percent, and by 
further reducing to Friedman’s zero nominal interest rate rule it resulted in a gain of 0.15 
percent of real income.  
Serletis and Yavari (2005) estimate the welfare cost of inflation for Italy. 
Estimating a long-horizon regression, they find that interest elasticity is 0.26. Using the 
same approaches of calculating welfare cost of inflation as in Serletis and Yavari (2003), 
they show that lowering the interest rate from 14 percent to 3 percent yield a benefit of 
about 0.4 percent of income. The same analysis was extended in Serletis and Yavari 
(2007) to calculate the direct cost of inflation for seven European countries, Ireland, 
Australia, Italy, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Belgium. The welfare cost estimates 
of these countries showed that the cost is not homogeneous across these countries and is 
related to the size of the economy. The  welfare cost was lower for Germany and France 
than for the smaller economies. 
The welfare costs of anticipated inflation are the distortions in the money demand 
brought about by the positive nominal interest rate so the major emphasis of studies after 
Lucas (2000) is first to check for the proper money demand specification. Ireland (2007) 
finds that Cagan-type semi-log money demand function is a better description of post 
1980 US data. For the quarterly data from 1980 to 2006, the semi-elasticity is estimated 
to be 1.79 and the welfare cost of inflation is measured using consumer’s surplus 
approach of calculating the area under the money demand curve. For a 2 percent inflation 
rate the welfare cost is 0.04 percent of income and 0.22 percent of income for the 10 
percent inflation rate.  Price stability is taken as a benchmark instead of Friedman’s 
optimal deflation policy. 
Gupta and Uwilingiye (2008) measure the welfare cost of inflation for South 
Africa. The double log and semi-log money demand functions are estimated using 
Johansen’s cointegration method and the long-horizon regression method. The study 
apart from estimating the proper money demand function analyses whether time 
aggregation affects the long-run nature of relationship or not. Interest elasticity and semi-
elasticity estimates are used to measure the welfare cost of inflation using Bailey’s 
traditional approach and Lucas’ compensating variation approach. The  estimation results 
show that for the period 1965:II to 2007:I, compared to the cointegration technique, the 
long-horizon approach gives a more consistent long-run relationship and welfare 
estimates under the two-time aggregation sampling methods. The welfare cost of target 
inflation band of 3 to 6 percent lies between 0.15 and 0.41 percent of income.  
In sum, the review of literature shows that the welfare cost of inflation has found 
its initial application in hyperinflation countries. In Bailey (1956), Marty (1967) and 
Barro (1972), and in many other studies, the welfare cost is measured mainly for the 
developed countries with stable inflation like the US and now it is extended to European 
countries and South Africa. This issue also needs to be addressed for developing 
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countries where inflation rate is primarily determined by money supply. For policy-
makers to conduct an effective monetary policy, it is important to estimate the welfare 
cost of inflation based on a stable estimated money demand function. As far as we know, 
this article is one of the first to calculate the welfare cost of inflation in Pakistan.  
Second, there is also a transition from partial equilibrium analysis to general 
equilibrium analysis to calculate the welfare cost of inflation. To provide general 
equilibrium rationale for holding money, we will use the Money-in-the-Utility Function 
model. Other general equilibrium models like Cash-in-Advance and transaction time 
technology models are relatively more sophisticated approaches but we cannot apply 
these due to two main reasons. First, the underlying assumptions of the models regarding 
distinction among the cash and credit goods do not seem effective in developing 
countries’ market environment. Secondly, the studies employing the CIA constraint in the 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model use the calibration technique, which makes use of the 
results of studies using microeconomic data. For most of the developing countries in 
general and specifically for Pakistan the data on non-durable (cash) goods and durable 
(credit) goods are not available. Similarly, the impact of inflation on marginal decisions 
like working hours, capital accumulation and investment decisions at micro level have 
not been addressed for Pakistan.  
 
(b)  Pakistan-Specific Empirical Money Demand Studies: A Review 
Welfare cost estimates are highly sensitive to the specification of money demand 
function. In this section we, therefore, provide a review of recent developments on this 
issue in Pakistan. From a theoretical prospective, the main determinants of money 
demand are the opportunity cost variables and the scale variable proxied by income. 
Mangla (1979) was the first who tested the empirical validity of these variables for 
Pakistan. In particular, using both GNP and permanent income as proxies for scale 
variables and both annual yield on government bonds and call money rate as a proxy for 
the opportunity cost of holding money, Mangla estimated the real and money demand for 
M1 over the period from 1958-1971. He found that the income elasticity of nominal 
demand for money was significantly greater than one and interest elasticity ranged from  
–0.04 to –0.16 for call money rate, while for the bonds’ yield it ranged from –0.31 to       
–0.96. He shows that while the income elasticity is greater than one, the interest elasticity 
turns out to be low, –0.02 to 0.02, for call money rate and positive for bonds’ yield. 
Khan (1980) estimates the demand for money and real balances by defining money 
as M1 and M2 for the period 1960 to 1978. The main objective of his study was to 
identify the correct scale variable—current or permanent income—for money demand 
function. Applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, he finds that the income 
elasticity for both nominal and real money demand functions is significantly greater than 
one, implying diseconomies of scale. He further argues that both permanent and current 
income give approximately similar results, lending no superiority to one measure over the 
other. For nominal money demand functions (M1 and M2), he reports that the interest 
elasticity is insignificant but for real money demand it has the expected negative sign.  
Similar analysis of finding appropriate scale and opportunity cost variables for the 
money demand function was carried out in Khan (1982). The scale variables were taken 
to be permanent income and measured income, while the opportunity cost variables were 
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the interest rate (call money rate, interest on time deposits) and the expected and actual 
inflation rates. Using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique the demand functions of M1 and M2 
were estimated for six Asian developing countries (Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, and Korea) for the period 1960 to 1978. For Pakistan with M1 definition of 
money, he finds that there is no difference between permanent and measured income 
elasticities. His estimates provide evidence that income elasticity is greater than one, 
representing diseconomies of scale. Money demand is significantly explained by interest 
on time deposits and interest elasticity ranged from –0.42 to –0.44. For broader money 
(M2),  he reports that the income elasticity is greater than for M1, and interest elasticity 
ranges from –0.37 to –0.39. For Pakistan, inflation and expected inflation tend to affect 
money demand but the magnitude (–0.05) is much less than the coefficient of interest 
rate. Khan (1982) also reaches the same conclusion as in Khan (1980) that interest rate is 
the proper opportunity cost variable in money demand function. 
Nisar and Aslam (1983) estimate the term structure of time deposits and substitute 
the parameters in the money demand function, using data over the period from 1960 to 
1979. They find that the coefficient of term structure for both M1 and M2 monetary 
aggregates is negative and has a smaller magnitude for the M2 definition of money 
ranging from –0.51 to –0.73. They also show that time deposits are positively related to 
interest rate (representing own rate of return), whereas interest rate has a negative effect 
on currency; so, overall, the magnitude of interest elasticity is low for M2 due to the 
inclusion of time deposits. Consistent with Khan (1982), they conclude that money 
demand is elastic with respect to the scale variable, while the coefficient of inflation rate 
bears a positive sign and is statistically not significant. Secondly, the study compares the 
stability of money demand function estimated by using term structure against the 
conventional money demand function with simple average interest rate (call money rate). 
The covariance analysis shows that the term structure money demand function remained 
stable while the conventional function does not pass the stability test. 
Developing countries like Pakistan lack sophisticated financial systems. Here 
currency constitutes a large proportion of total monetary assets. Qayyum (1994) using 
data from 1962:I to 1985:II estimates the long-run demand for currency holding. He 
shows that currency demand is determined by interest rate defined as bonds rate, the rate 
of inflation and income. With the coefficient of income at approximate unity,  the money-
income proportionality hypothesis is tested. Further, he argues that money-income 
proportionality holds and imposing this restriction, the steady state demand for currency 
turns out to be related to inflation and the bonds rate. The coefficients of inflation and 
interest are negative and significant showing that people can substitute between currency 
and real goods, and also between currency and financial assets. 
Hossain (1994) estimates the money demand for both the real narrow (M1) and 
broad money (M2) balances for the two sub-periods ranging from 1951 to 1991 and 1972 
to 1991. The double log specification of money demand function is used with income, 
interest rate (government bond yield, call money rate) and inflation rate as the 
explanatory variables. The results for the sample period from 1972 to 1991 are more 
encouraging where the income elasticity for broad money is around unity and about 0.86 
for the narrow money. Interest elasticity in absolute terms is greater for narrow money   
(–0.54) than for M2 (–0.05). The results for both the sample periods show that real 
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money balances are not cointegrated with the inflation rate and that the narrow money 
demand is more stable than the broad money demand function. 
The financial sector reforms of the 1980s increased the interest in money demand 
function. Khan (1994) and Tariq and Matthews (1997) investigated the impact of 
financial liberalisation on money demand. In particular, Khan (1994) examines the effect 
of these reforms on the stability of money demand. The Engle-Granger two-step method 
of cointegration is used to estimate the money demand function using quarterly data 
starting from 1971:III to 1993:II. The results of cointegration analysis for double-log 
money (nominal M1 and M2) demand function show that demand for broader money is 
determined by real income, nominal interest rate of medium term maturity real interest 
rates, and the inflation rate. The cointegration relationship holds for all the arguments 
except short-term and medium-term nominal interest rates in the context of M1 
definition.  
The second study on the effects of financial reforms is Tariq and Matthews (1997) 
that investigated the impact of deregulation on the definition of monetary aggregates. In 
this study divisia monetary aggregates are compared to simple monetary aggregates in 
order to find the stable money demand function. The conventional money demand 
function is estimated with the scale and opportunity cost variable and the opportunity cost 
is taken as differential of interest on an alternative asset and own rate of return on the 
given monetary aggregate. Cointegration analysis shows that demand for all the four 
monetary aggregates, M1, M2, Divisia M1 and Divisia M2 is positively related to the 
scale variable and negatively to the opportunity cost variable. Income elasticity is seen to 
be greater than unity implying that velocity has a decreasing trend. The error correction 
model (ECM) is used to estimate the short-run dynamic money demand function, which 
shows that all the four monetary aggregates are equally good in explaining the money 
demand function and there is no superiority of divisia aggregates over the simple-sum 
monetary aggregates. 
There is a difference between the money demand behaviour of household and 
business sectors in studies relating to sectoral money demand in developed countries. Its 
first application in Pakistan is Qayyum (2000) who studies the demand for money by the 
business sector. Owing to the difference in the behaviour of business sector, the  total sale 
is taken as the scale variable instead of income. He shows that the long-run demand for 
M1 is determined by sales and inflation rate. The sales/transactions elasticity of business 
sector’s demand for real balances is unitary. In the long run the demand for money is not 
determined by the interest rate, but the short-run dynamic ECM shows that money 
demand is determined by changes in the return on saving deposits, changes in inflation 
rate, and movements in the previous money holding.  
Qayyum (2001) estimates the money demand function at aggregate level and for 
both the household and business sectors using quarterly data from 1959:III to 1985:II. He 
finds that all the three money demand functions are sensitive to income, inflation rate and 
interest rate. He concludes that bonds rate is the relevant opportunity cost variable in 
aggregate and household money demand functions. For the business sector, the 
appropriate interest rate representing opportunity cost is the rate of interest on bank 
advances. The money-scale variable proportionality holds in all the money demand 
functions. The scale variable is defined as income/real GDP for the aggregate and 
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household money demand function while for the business sector it is real sales. The 
business sector demand for real balances is explained by own rate of return and the 
inflation rate. The money-sales proportionality is shown to hold in the long run. The 
results from ECM show that in the short run interest rate is an important variable 
determining the aggregate demand for real balances and liquidity demand of the business 
sector. 
Another study by Qayyum (2005) estimates the demand for broader money M2 at 
the aggregate level for the annual data from 1960 to 1999. This study reaches similar 
conclusion as Qayyum (2001) that the major determinants of money demand are own rate 
of return (call money rate) and opportunity cost variables (inflation rate and government 
bond yield) and income. However, the magnitude of coefficients is high for both the 
interest rates.  
Using annual data from 1972 to 2005, Hussain, et al. (2006) estimated the demand 
for money; money is defined as monetary base, M1 and M2. The study finds that there is 
no cointegration and unit root in the data series. They model the demand for all the three 
monetary aggregates as a function of the real GDP, inflation rate, financial innovation 
and the interest rate on time deposits. They find that the long run income elasticity ranges 
from 0.74 to 0.779 and interest elasticity ranges from –0.344 to –0.464. Of all the three 
definitions of money M2 is found to better explain the long-run stable money demand 
function. 
Ahmad, et al. (2007) estimate the long-run money demand function using the error 
correction model. The conventional money demand function with income and call money 
rate is estimated for the period 1953 to 2003. The results show that both the arguments of 
money demand function have theoretically the correct signs for M1 and interest semi-
elasticity is –0.012. The interest rate coefficient is positive and insignificant for real M2. 
For both narrow money M1 and broad money M2 the money-income proportionality does 
not hold. 
In this study we want to calculate the welfare cost of inflation based on the 
estimated parameters of a stable money demand function. The studies on welfare cost of 
inflation suggest that we have to define money in the narrowest form, like monetary base 
or M1 so that the interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money.5  Estimating the 
demand for broader monetary aggregate (M2) is not relevant for our analysis because it 
includes some interest bearing assets; the interest coefficient in most of the studies turned 
out to be positive or insignificant showing that interest rate is own rate of return rather 
than an opportunity cost variable for M2.  
The welfare cost is a steady state analysis for which the money-income 
proportionality is assumed to hold. Following the social welfare loss of inflation analysis 
we need to (newly) re-estimate the money demand function taking the ratio of money 
balances to income (scale variable) as the dependent variable with a single argument—
the nominal interest rate. We estimate demand functions defining money as monetary 
base, narrow money M1 and disintegrating M1 into its constituent components and 
estimate the demand functions of demand deposit and currency.  
 
5Hussain (1994) argues that narrow money demand in Pakistan is more stable than broad money 
demand. 
72 Mushtaq, Rashid, and Qayyum 
 
3.  ESTIMATION METHODS 
Following Bali (2000), we estimate the currency-deposit model to analyse the 
welfare cost of inflation in Pakistan. The rationality of employing the currency-deposit 
model is that both currency and deposits have different opportunity costs. The implicit 
cost of holding currency is the nominal interest (i), while that of demand deposit is the 
difference between the nominal interest rate (i) and the interest on deposits (id). The 
studies that lump both the currency and demand deposits together as non-interest bearing 
assets are likely to overstate the true cost of inflation [see, for details, Lucas (1994, 
2000)]. Another advantage of this disintegrated asset model is that the single monetary 
asset models are the nested models of this broader model.  
When estimating the model, we ignore uncertainty and labour-choice, focusing on 
the implications of the model for money demand and the welfare cost of inflation. 
Further, we assume that the representative household derives utility from consumption 
good (ct) and flow of services from the real money balances that consist of currency (mt) 
and demand deposits (dt). In particular, the utility function takes the following form:  
),()1(
0
,
1
tt
t
t dcmU∑
∞
=
−ρ+
 … … … … … … (1) 
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference. In Equation (1), the utility function is 
assumed to be increasing in all the three arguments, strictly concave and continuously 
differentiable. The economy-wide budget constraint of the household sector, in real units, 
is given by 
))(1()1()1()1( 11111111 tidmbrkdm dttttttttt ++=+++pi++pi+ +−++++++
 
ttttt hckfbk +−++δ−+ )()1(  … … … … … (2)  
The budget constraint indicates that a household can transfer resources from one 
period to the next by holding real money stock consisting of non-interest bearing real 
currency (mt), interest bearing real demand deposits (dt), bonds (bt), and physical capital 
(kt). Given the current income f(kt), its assets and any net transfer (ht) from the 
government sector, the household allocates its resources among current consumption (ct) 
and savings (left side of Equation (2)). The real rate of return on bonds )1( 1++ tr  is equal 
to ),1/()1( 11 ++ pi++ tti
 
where 1+ti denotes the nominal return on bonds held from t to t+1, 
whereas )1( di+  is the return on demand deposits. 
A household maximises its utility Equation (1) subject to budget constraint 
Equation (2). Solving the optimisation problem for two periods, t and t–1, yields the 
following first-order Euler equations: 
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Euler Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the marginal rate of substitution between 
money and consumption and between deposits and consumption is equal to the opportunity 
costs of respective assets. These first order Euler equations are the implicit form of asset 
demand functions, which can be estimated by assuming some specific form of utility function.  
In order to derive the implications of the model for welfare costs of inflation using 
the Lucas compensation variation approach, the following CES isoelastic utility function 
is used: 
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where 0>θ  is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. Substituting the marginal 
utilities from Equation (5) into Euler Equations (3) and (4) gives the following real 
currency and real deposit demand functions: 
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The steady state analysis of welfare cost of inflation requires that the proportion of 
income held as cash, should be independent to the growth in real income. This implies 
that velocity remains constant.6 Under the steady state we write the money demand 
function as the ratio of real money balances to the real scale variable. It further requires 
that both currency and demand deposits have the same interest elasticities (θ). It may be 
recalled that the cost of holding money defined as demand deposits, is the disparity 
between the yield on other assets (it) and interest on deposits (id) when the banks are 
operating at zero profit condition, id = (1 – µ)it, where µ is the reserve ratio. The zero 
profit condition implies that the opportunity cost of holding deposits is (it – id) = µi. 
Below, Equation (7) presents the demand function for demand deposits. 
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6Velocity becomes function of the interest rate and it is transformed to money demand function, 
which is integrated under Bailey’s approach to get welfare cost as a proportion of scale variable. 
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where γ/α and γ/β are the scale elasticities of demand for real currency and real deposits and 1/α and1/β 
are elasticities of currency and deposits with respect to their respective opportunity costs.  Unitary scale 
elasticities require that α = β = γ must hold, which implies that the assets demand functions have same 
opportunity cost elasticities. 
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For the single monetary asset the utility function in money-in-utility (MIU) 
framework takes the form as:  
),()1(
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Solving the optimisation problem with changing the budget constraint without the 
role of demand deposits gives the money demand function equivalent to the currency 
demand function presented in Equation (6).  
 
3.1.  Money Demand Specification 
To compute the welfare cost function we estimate both the double log and semi-
log money demand functions. 
 
3.1.1.  Double-log Money Demand Function 
To calculate the welfare cost of inflation we are interested specifically in the effect 
of opportunity cost (nominal interest rate) on money holding. The demand for real 
balances is given by  
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where  the left side in the above equation is the ratio of money stock to price level 
showing the demand for real balances as function of nominal interest rate it, and yt is the 
real income. In the long-run, the liquidity demand function takes the following form.   
( ) ( )yimyiL =,  … … … … … … … (8) 
Equation (8) indicates that money demand is proportional to income.  It is 
evident that the estimates of the income elasticity of money demand (i.e., M1, M2 
and currency) obtained for Pakistan tend to be around unity [Qayyum (1994, 2000, 
2001, 2005)]. Therefore, the unitary scale (income) elasticity restriction is imposed 
which enables us to estimate the money demand function (m(i)) defined as the ratio 
of real money balances to real income with the single argument defined as the 
opportunity cost of holding money.  
)(/ imym =
 … … … … … … … (9) 
Equations (6) and (7) are in the form of (8) and dividing by the scale variable can 
be converted into the final form of demand function required for the analysis of welfare 
cost. 
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These equations take the form of Equation (9) and can be written in the following 
double log form:   
( ) 10 α−α= ieim
 … … … … … … … (10) 
( ) ( ) 12 α−α µ=µ ieid
  
… … … … … … (11) 
where the dependent variables are taken as ratio to scale variable and welfare cost is 
expressed as the percentage of GDP. 
 
3.1.2. Semi-log Money Demand Function 
The standard utility functions mostly yield double-log money demand function, 
but the semi-log models have gained great applications in money demand literature for its 
seigniorage implications. A  number of studies, such as Lucas (2000), Bali (2000) and 
Gupta and Uwilingiye (2008), have estimated both the double log and semi-log money 
demand functions and compared welfare costs associated with both the specifications. 
Following these studies, we also estimate the semi-log money demand function along 
with the log-linear function and judge the sensitivity of the estimated welfare cost for the 
two models towards low interest rates.  
To compare the semi-log model with the derived double log currency-deposit 
model we restrict both currency and demand deposits to have the same interest semi-
elasticity. The demand functions for currency and deposits under the semi-log 
specification are given as follow: 
( ) ieim 10 α−α=
 … … … … … … … (12) 
( ) )(12 ieid µα−α=
 … … … … … … … (13) 
After estimating the steady state money demand functions the welfare cost will be 
computed using both Bailey’s and Lucas’ measures of welfare cost. What follows below, 
is a brief discussion of these welfare cost measures.  
 
3.2.  Welfare Cost of Inflation and Money Demand Function 
 
3.2.1.  Bailey’s Consumer Surplus Approach 
The first attempt to measure the welfare cost of anticipated inflation is credited to 
Bailey (1956) wherein the nominal interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding money. 
The inflationary finance/anticipated inflation is excise tax on real cash holding; and the 
welfare cost is the loss in consumer surplus and is measured as the area under the money 
demand curve. Changes in inflation rate are related to changes in nominal interest rate 
through the Fisher hypothesis that holds for Pakistan [Hassan (1999)]. Thus, the welfare 
cost is measured as the loss in consumer surplus not compensated by total revenue. This 
can be described as follows:   
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where )(rm  is money demand function and )(xψ is the inverse demand function. m is 
defined as ratio of money to income, the welfare function w is the function of income; 
therefore, welfare loss is defined as proportion of  income.   
 
3.2.1.1. Welfare Cost of Inflation for Semi-log Money Demand Function 
Bailey (1956), Marty (1967), Friedman (1969) and Tower (1971) have used the 
Cagan semi-log money demand function. All these studies were based on hyperinflation 
economies, and welfare gain for this specification comes largely by moving from high 
interest to low interest rates, while for the interest rate approaching zero, the solution is 
trivial. 
 
(a)  Single Monetary Asset Model 
When monetary stock is taken to be monetary base or M1 (single monetary asset 
model) the semi-log money demand function is given as follows:  
( ) ioerm 1α−α=
 
Substituting the money demand function in Equation (14) gives the following welfare 
cost measure  
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where αo  is the intercept in money demand function and α1 is the interest rate related 
semi-elasticity of money demand. 
 
(b)  Currency-Deposit Model  
For the modified money-in-utility function, which allows for the distinct role of 
currency and demand deposits, the welfare cost takes the following form:  
∫∫
µ
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where demand for currency is iexf 10)( α−α= and semi-log demand function for deposits 
is iexg βµ−β= 0)( . The first term in Equation (16) represents the dead weight loss 
accruing from currency while the second term is the dead weight loss measured for 
demand deposit. For currency, the integral runs from zero to positive nominal interest (i) 
and for demand deposits it runs from zero to opportunity cost of holding demand deposits 
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(µi). Under the restricted model, where both currency and deposits are restricted, the 
semi-elasticities should have to be the same, 11 β=α
.
 
 
3.2.1.2.Welfare Cost of Inflation for Double log Money Demand Function 
 
(a)  Single Monetary Asset Model 
The double log money demand specification for a single monetary asset (i.e., 
monetary base or M1) is given as follows:   
10)( α−α= ieim
 
So, the welfare cost formula is derived by substituting the money demand function 
in Equation (14), which is presented as follows:  
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where αo and α1 are the intercept and slope coefficient of double log money demand 
function respectively. 
 
(b)  Currency-Deposit Model 
For the double log demand for currency and deposits, the expression given in 
Equation (14) becomes as follows: 
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The welfare cost formula shows that the cost is entirely in terms of αo, α1, βo and 
β1, parameters of the estimated asset demand functions and their opportunity costs. 
 
3.2.2.  Lucas Compensating Variation Approach 
Lucas in arriving at a welfare measure starts with the assumption that two 
economies have similar technology and preferences; the only difference is in the conduct 
of monetary policy. In one of the economies Friedman’s zero interest rate policy is 
adopted whereas in the other economy, the interest rate is positive. He defines the welfare 
cost of inflation as compensation in income (defined as percentage of income) required to 
leave the household (living in the second economy),  being indifferent to live in either of 
the two economies. 
The left side of Equation (19) shows the welfare in second economy with a 
positive interest rate and the right hand side is the characterisation of the first economy 
operating at deflation policy. w(i) is the measure of income compensation or the welfare 
cost of inflation. 
)]0(),0(,1[)](),(),(1[ dmuidimiwu =µ+
 … … … … (19) 
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Lucas has given two measures of welfare cost for the two specifications of long-
run money demand function due to their different behaviour at low interest rates; (a) 
Square-Root Formula, and (b) Quadratic Approximation. 
 
3.2.2.1.  Welfare Cost of Inflation for Semi-log Money Demand Function  
and Quadratic Approximation 
The semi-log money demand specification originally due to Cagan (1956) and 
Bailey (1956) gives rise to a quadratic formula for the welfare cost of inflation. Under 
this specification there is satiation in money demand, and thus, the quadratic formula 
derived for this specification is sensitive to high interest rate. Wolman (1997) and 
Bakhshi (2002) show that for the semi-log model there is satiation in asset holding m(0) 
and d(0) in Equation (19), representing maximum currency  and demand deposits’ 
holdings at zero interest rate. The above mentioned studies also showed that under 
satiation the welfare gain of moving from positive inflation to zero inflation is higher 
compared to the gains of moving further to Friedman’s zero interest rules.   
To derive the quadratic formula from Equation (19) the second-order Taylor series 
expansion is applied to the welfare function around zero interest rate.  
2
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(a)  Single Monetary Asset Model 
For the single-monetary-asset model, Equation (19) takes the following form:    
[ ] [ ])0(,1)(),(1 muimiwu =+  
And the welfare cost of inflation is expressed as follows: 
2)0(
2
1)( imiw η=
  … … … … … … (21)   
where η is the semi-elasticity of demand for M1 or monetary base with respect to interest rate. 
  
(b)  Currency-Deposit Model 
Assuming that demand deposits and currency have the same semi-elasticity 
(restricted case) the welfare loss formula (20) is transformed as follows: 7 
[ ])0()0(
2
1)( 22 dmiiw µ+η=
 … … … … … (22) 
Given the semi-log demand functions iemim η−= )0()( , )()0()( iedid µη−=µ , )0(m
and )0(d  initial conditions are calculated by assuming )(im and )(id functions pass 
 
7For the unrestricted model that allows for different semi-elasticities for currency and deposits the 
welfare cost formula is written as [ ])0()0(
2
1)( 2dmiw εµ+η= where η is the semi-elasticity of currency and ε is 
the semi-elasticity of demand deposits. 
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through the values of currency holdings, deposits, and interest rates observed at the end 
of the sample period. Semi-elasticity η is measured from long-run semi-log asset demand 
functions.  
 
3.2.2.2. Welfare Cost of Inflation for Double log Money Demand Function and Square-
Root Formula 
The Square-Root formula is applicable if double log is the proper specification of 
money demand function. Under this specification, as the nominal interest rate approaches 
zero, the demand for real balances becomes arbitrarily large [Ireland (2007)], and 
Equation (19) takes the following form: 
[ ] [ ]∞∞=µ+ ,,1)(),(),(1 uidimiwu .  
 
(a)  Single Monetary Asset Model 
Welfare cost formula for a single monetary aggregate (Monetary base or M1) 
without assigning distinct roles to currency and deposits is given as:  
( )[ ] ( ) 11)( 1/1 111 −−= −ααα−α tieiw o  … … … … … (23) 
Where α1is the slope (interest elasticity) and α0 is the intercept term in log-linear model 
with single monetary aggregate. 
 
(b)  Currency-Deposit Model 
For currency-deposit welfare cost is calibrated by employing estimated parameters 
from log-log specification of the demand deposits and currency demand functions. 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 11)( 1/111 111121 −µ−−= −ααα−α−αα−α ttt ieieiw o  … … … (24) 
This model is derived from CES utility function where α1 is the interest elasticity 
for both the assets demand functions. The welfare cost of inflation is measured by 
empirically estimating the money demand function parameters. Specifically, welfare 
costs are measured as the value of welfare measures evaluated at different nominal 
interest rates.  
 
3.3.  Estimation Procedure and Empirical Technique 
The main objective of the study is to estimate the stable money demand function 
for Pakistan and to compute the welfare cost of inflation. The cointegration technique is 
used to determine the long-run relationship between different time series. Specifically, 
we use the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model to estimate the long-run interest 
elasticity and semi-elasticity of money demand function. This approach has an advantage 
that it provides long-run coefficients even for small data sets and it does not require all 
the regressors to be integrated of the same order that is I(1). That is, it can be applied 
even in the case where the regressors have a mixed order of integration; the only 
restriction is that none of the variable should be I(2) or integrated of order greater than 1. 
Further, the problem of endogeneity also does not affect the bounds test for cointegration.  
80 Mushtaq, Rashid, and Qayyum 
 
To apply the bounds test for cointegration, the Unrestricted Error Correction 
Model (UECM) representation of double log money demand function: 10)( α−α= ierm takes 
the following form:  
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In this equation mt is real money balances’ taken ratio to real GDP, it is the interest 
rate, β0 is the intercept, β1 and β2 are the slope coefficients and λ is the coefficient of error 
correction term ut–1; this term shows the correction of the model towards the long-run 
equilibrium. If the error correction term is replaced by the lagged variables, we get the 
ARDL model incorporating short-run and long-run information.8 
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Similarly to estimate the interest, the semi-elasticity of money demand, the ARDL 
model takes the following form 
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We employ the ARDL two-step method of Bahmani-Oskooee and Bohal (2000) 
and find the maximum lag length (p), the order of UECM and check the existence of the 
long-run relationship. The null hypothesis of no cointegration implies that coefficients of 
lagged level variables β3 and β4 are simultaneously zero. The ARDL approach of Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) can be applied by the OLS method and the test is based on comparing 
the F-value (joint significance of lagged levels of variables) of the model with the critical 
bounds values given in Pesaran, et al. (2001). It reports the two asymptotic critical 
bounds values under two conditions (i) lower bounds assuming all the regressors to be 
I(0) and (ii) upper bound taking all the regressors to be I(1). If the calculated F-statistics 
is less than the lower bound, it shows that there is no long-run relationship, if F-value 
falls between the lower and the upper bound, it means we enter the indecisive region, it is 
only when the F-value is greater than the upper bound that the cointegration relationship 
comes into play.  
After identifying the existence of the long-run relationship and maximum lag 
length, we proceed to the second step and find the optimal lag length based on Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC),9 and 2R , and calculate 
the long-run coefficients of the model.  Finally diagnostic tests are applied to check that 
the model passes the functional form stability, heteroscedasticity and the serial 
correlation tests. 
 
 
8Long-run elasticity can be derived directly as – (β4/β3).  
9Computation of ARDL procedure in Microfit 4.0 selects the optimal lag on the basis of maximum 
values of AIC and SBC.   
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4.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
We use annual data for different monetary aggregates. The sample covers the 
period from 1960 to 2007. We use income measured by gross domestic product (GDP) as 
a scale variable in our empirical investigation.  Monetary aggregates that we use in this 
paper are M1, monetary base, currency, and demand deposits. Both GDP and monetary 
assets are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) to get real balances to real income 
ratio.  
For single monetary aggregates and currency, we use the nominal interest rate (call 
money rate) as a proxy for the opportunity cost. For the demand deposit model, the long-
term interest rate, the relevant opportunity cost variable is defined as the difference 
between interest rate offered on other assets (long-term assets) minus own rate of return 
(the rate of return on current and other deposits).  
Data on deposit rates excluding current and other deposits are compiled by the 
SBP since 1990. Using the State Bank’s definition, we have calculated it for the period 
1960 to 1990 as weighted average of the interest rates on the individual longer-term 
components of time deposits, with the weights being the quantity shares of these deposits. 
The calculation of the welfare cost of inflation requires the information of the average 
reserve ratio for the entire sample period. The Reserve Ratio is measured as the reserves 
taken as ratio to deposits.10 
Data on nominal GDP, monetary stocks, consumer price index (CPI) and call 
money rates are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The 
data for rate of return on long-term maturity deposits, however, are taken from State 
Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports. Figure 1 plots the percentage change in price levels 
(CPI).  
 
Fig 1.Trend in Inflation Rate, 1961-2007 
 
 
 
10Following Agenor and Montiel (1996) reserve ratio is measured as (Reserve Money – Currency)/(M1 
+ Quasi   Money – Currency).  
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
(%
)
Years
Inflation
–  
82 Mushtaq, Rashid, and Qayyum 
 
5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
5.1.  Testing for Unit Root 
We begin our examination by checking the stationarity of the data using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test. To select the appropriate lag order for the 
ADF equations, we started with zero lag and continued adding lags until the Breusch 
Godfrey LM test, applied to the residual of the ADF regression, showed no serial 
correlation. Whether the ADF regression has an intercept only or an intercept along with 
trend, the ADF general-to-specific method was used as suggested in Enders (2004). 
Starting with the general form which includes both the constant and deterministic trend, 
the significance of the trend coefficient based on the t-test is checked. If it is significant 
and the hypothesis of unit root is not rejected, we conclude that the test includes the 
constant and the trend.  
Table 1 presents the results of the ADF test. The coefficient on liner-time trend 
term appears statistically significant for only the log (demand deposits/GDP) variable. 
The estimates provide strong evidence that all the variables are non-stationary in their 
level, while their first differences are stationary, meaning all the series are I(1). As none 
of the series is integrated of the order greater than one, we can apply ARDL bounds test 
for cointegration. 
 
Table 1 
Unit Root Test Results 
Variable 
Levels First Differences 
Lags Model τ – value Lags Model τ- value 
Log(M1/GDP) 1 constant –2.6890 0 constant –5.9508** 
Log(Mo/GDP) 0 constant –2.4537 0 constant –6.7867** 
Log (Currency/GDP) 2 constant –2.0391 0 constant –5.4555** 
Log (Demand Deposits/GDP) 0 Const & Trend –2.6438 0 Const & Trend –7.1718** 
Interest Rate 0 constant –2.4830 0 constant –6.7077** 
Log (Interest Rate) 0 constant –2.6760 1 constant –5.7319** 
Deposit Rate 0 constant –1.7544 0 constant –7.5469** 
Log (Deposit Rate) 1 constant –2.3256 0 constant –5.3193** 
Notes:  ADF regression equation: 
tti
p
i
tt uytyy +∆β+α+γ+α=∆ −
=
− Σ 1
1
210
 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the ADF test apply on the coefficient of the first lag of dependent 
variable γ. Under null hypothesis γ = 0 or the series is non-stationary and under alternative hypothesis of 
stationarity, γ <0. γ has non-standard distribution so τ-value is compared to McKinnon (1991) critical values. 
Critical values at 5 percent level of significance are –2.9266 and –3.51074 for the constant only and constant 
and trend models, respectively. ** Indicates that the series are stationary at the 1 percent level of significance.  
 
5.2.  Estimation of Money Demand Function and Calculation 
of Welfare Cost of Inflation for Monetary Base 
 
5.2.1.  Estimating Demand Function for Monetary Base 
As earlier mentioned, we apply the two-step ARDL approach. Specifically, in the 
first step, we test the existence of the long-run relationship, using the bounds test. After 
confirmation of the presence of the long-run relationship, the ARDL framework proposed 
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by Pesaran and Shin (1999) is used to estimate the long-run estimates of the underlying 
variables. We estimate two different specifications of money demand function, namely 
semi-log and double log demand function, based on the monetary base.11 
The F-statistics to test for the existence of cointegration are sensitive to the order 
of lag in the model, therefore the ARDL (1, 0) is selected based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) for both semi- and 
double-log money demand functions with money taken to be the monetary base. Besides, 
several tests are applied to the selected model to confirm the volatility of the estimated 
model. The results are presented in Table 2. 
The estimated F-statistics given in Panel A of the table provide evidence of the 
presence of long-run association between the variables. Specifically, as we can see from 
the table, the value of F-statistic is greater than the upper critical bounds, indicating the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. This implies that the variables 
included in the model have a stable long-run equilibrium relationship. This holds for both 
semi- and double-log models.  
 
Table 2 
ARDL Results for Monetary Base 
 
No. of Optimal Lags  
Semi-log Demand 
Function 
Double-log Demand 
Function 
Panel A: F-statistics for Testing the Existence of Long-run Relationship  
1 55.744*** 53.920*** 
Panel B: Long-run Coefficients  
Regressor Coefficient Coefficient 
  Constant  –1.366*** –2.665*** 
  Interest rate  –0.054*** –0.331*** 
   
2R  0.786 0.779 
DW–statistic  1.990 1.949 
F-statistic 85.263*** 82.218*** 
Panel C: Diagnostic Tests  
χ
2
SC(1)     0.002[0.960] 0.017[0.894] 
χ
2
FF(1)     1.343[0.246] 1.102[0.294] 
χ
2
N(2)    25.125[0.000] 0.159[0.690] 
χ
2
Het(1)    0.240[0.624] 22.717[0.000] 
CUSUM 0.323[0.742] 0.135[0.412] 
CUSUMSQ 0.216[0.865] 0.223[0.534] 
Notes: Asymptotic critical bounds values are obtained from Pesaran, et al. (2001) Table F in Appendix C, Case 
III: unrestricted intercept and no trend for k=1, at 1 percent level of significance lower bound = 6.84 and 
upper bound = 7.84, at 5 percent level of significance lower bound = 4.94 and upper bound = 5.73.  
The Lagrange Multiplier statistics χ2SC(1),χ2FF(1), χ2Het(1), and χ2N(2) with degrees of freedom in parentheses 
are the tests for serial correlation, functional form mis-specification, Heteroscedasticity, and Normality, 
respectively. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are the tests for testing the null hypothesis of no structure break, 
i.e., the estimated coefficients are the same in every period.  
 
11As unit root test showed that monetary base and interest rate series had drift only so the ARDL 
equation does not include trend term.  
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The long-run estimates of the models are given in Panel B of Table 2. Both the 
parameters of the model are significant regardless of whether the model is estimated in 
semi-log or double-log form. The interest rate semi-elasticity of monetary base (α1) 
shows that a 1 percent increase in nominal interest rate lowers the demand for monetary 
base by 5.4 percent. The value of adjusted R2 (0.79) shows that the ARDL specification 
(1, 0) is a quite good fit.  
The long-run estimates from the double log demand function have expected signs 
and are statistically significant. The interest rate elasticity of the demand for monetary 
base is 0.33, almost the same to those (0.34) estimated in Hussain, et al. (2006). The 
value of adjusted R2 is 0.77 which shows the goodness of the fit of the model. The results 
of diagnostic tests reported in Panel C of the table provide evidence that both of the 
models are well specified and free from the specification errors. Specifically, diagnostic 
tests indicate that there is no problem of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and 
functional form mis-specification in the selected models. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
test results provide evidence that there is no structure break in the estimated coefficients.   
 
5.2.2.  Calculating Welfare Cost of Inflation for Monetary Base 
In this subsection we calculate the welfare cost of inflation using the Lucas 
compensating variation measure and the consumer’s surplus measure for both semi-log and 
double-log models.  The results are presented in Table 3. The welfare cost is measured both as 
moving from Friedman’s optimal inflation rate to some positive inflation rate (from zero 
nominal interest rate to a positive interest rate) and moving from zero inflation (stable price) to 
a positive inflation rate. The real interest rate is approximately 2 percent for 2007, therefore,    
i = 0.02 is the benchmark value of nominal interest rate under zero inflation.12 When i = 0.08 
it means the inflation rate is 6 percent, and for i = 0.10 the inflation rate is 8 percent.  
Table 3 shows the welfare cost as percent of GDP associated with increasing 
interest rate from zero to a positive rate. The welfare cost entry against each interest rate 
is the loss in welfare for deviating from the Friedman’s Deflation rule. 
The second column of the table shows the welfare cost using the compensating 
variation approach. The welfare cost of 5 percent nominal interest (3 percent inflation) is 
0.15 percent of GDP against zero inflation, while comparing with zero nominal interest 
rate (optimal deflation rule) the cost is approximately 0.18 percent of GDP. Keeping in 
view the end of sample period inflation rate of 7 percent (i = 0.09) the welfare gain of 
moving towards zero inflation (i = 0.02) is 0.55 percent of GDP (the difference between 
the welfare costs at 9 percent and 2 percent nominal interest, 0.583 and 0.028 
respectively) and further moving to the deflation rate results in an additional gain of 
0.028 percent of GDP.  
The welfare cost based on the consumer’s surplus approach is given in column 3 
of Table 3. The welfare cost of 5 percent nominal interest rate is 0.12 percent of GDP 
against price stability and slightly higher at 0.14 percent of GDP when compared to zero 
nominal interest rate. Similarly the welfare cost of 9 percent inflation is 0.41 percent of 
against the deflation rate, which is less than the 0.58 percent of GDP calculated under the 
Lucas (2000) approach form. We find that for all the nominal interest rates, the welfare 
cost is higher under the compensating approach than under Bailey’s approach. 
 
12Following Gillman (1993) i = 0.093 and π = 0.0721 giving the value of r approximately equal to 0.02. 
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Table 3 
The Welfare Cost of Inflation for Monetary Base 
 
Semi-log Model Double-log Model 
Interest Rate 
Compensation 
Variation 
Approach 
Consumer’s 
Surplus 
Approach 
Compensation 
Variation 
Approach 
Consumer’s 
Surplus 
Approach 
0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.01 0.007 0.006 0.159 0.159 
0.02 0.028 0.026 0.254 0.253 
0.03 0.064 0.056 0.333 0.332 
0.04 0.115 0.097 0.404 0.402 
0.05 0.180 0.146 0.470 0.467 
0.06 0.259 0.203 0.531 0.527 
0.07 0.353 0.266 0.590 0.584 
0.08 0.461 0.336 0.645 0.639 
0.09 0.583 0.411 0.699 0.691 
0.10 0.720 0.490 0.750 0.742 
0.20 2.882 1.395 1.200 1.179 
0.30 6.484 2.276 1.583 1.546 
0.40 11.528 2.991 1.928 1.874 
0.50 18.012 3.523 2.249 2.175 
0.60 25.938 3.899 2.552 2.457 
0.70 35.304 4.156 2.841 2.724 
0.80 46.112 4.327 3.118 2.978 
0.90 58.360 4.439 3.387 3.222 
1.00 72.050 4.511 3.648 3.457 
For Semi-log Model 
Compensation variation approach: w(i) =0.7205i2 
Consumer’s surplus approach: [ ])499.51(1
4999.5
4999.5
3668.1
ieeWC i +−= −
−
 
For Double log Model 
Compensation variation approach: [ ] 10696.01)( 4967.066814.0 1 −−= −tiiw
 
Consumer’s surplus approach: 66814.0665.24967.0 ieWC −=  
 
The costs under the two approaches are comparable for the single digit nominal 
interest rate and the difference widens for the higher interest rates. Deviating from 
Friedman’s Deflation rule, the cost of 20 percent nominal interest rate is 2.8 percent of 
income under Lucas’ approach, while for Bailey’s approach the cost is 1.4 percent. The 
difference between the calculated welfare losses from the two approaches is due to the 
quadratic nature of the compensating variation formula, in which the nominal interest rate 
appears in the quadratic form.   
For the log-log money demand function, the estimated welfare costs are given in 
the last two columns of Table 3. The welfare cost of 5 percent nominal interest rate is 
0.47 percent of real income. The welfare cost of 5 percent inflation against the 
benchmark of zero inflation is 0.21 percent of income. The cost of 9 percent nominal 
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interest rate, the call money rate at the end of sample period, costs about 0.7 percent of 
real output. Reducing the nominal interest rate from 9 to 2 percent (under zero inflation) 
yields welfare gain equivalent to an increase in income by 0.44 percent.  
Similar to the case of semi-log money demand function, the welfare costs 
estimated, based on consumer’s surplus approach, are lower than the welfare costs 
estimated using the compensation variation approach. However, for the log-log money 
demand model, the difference is minor. 
Comparing the estimated welfare costs across both specifications of demand for 
money, we find that the welfare cost of inflation for moderate inflation under semi-log 
money demand function is relatively small compared to that under the log-log model. 
Moving from zero inflation to the deflation rule results in welfare gain of only 0.02 
percent of GDP in semi-log model compared to a substantial gain of 0.25 percent of GDP 
for the double log model.13 
The welfare losses (relative to deflation rule) at different nominal interest rates are 
plotted in Figure 2. The nominal interest rate up to 20 percent is taken on the horizontal 
axis. The two approaches give almost the same welfare loss calculations for low 
inflation/interest rates but they tend to diverge for higher interest rates. 
 
Fig 2.  The Welfare Cost of Inflation for Monetary Base 
 
 
5.3.  Estimation of Money Demand Function and Calculation of Welfare  
Cost of Inflation for M1 
 
5.3.1. Estimating Demand Function for M1 
Table 4 presents the ARDL results for M1. Similar to the case of monetary base, 
two  specification of  demand for money, namely semi-log model and log-log model,  are  
 
13Wolman (1997) and Ireland (2007) show that towards low interest rate the semi-log model shows 
satiation in money holding but for the double log model the money holdings take asymptotic trend as nominal 
interest rate approaches zero. 
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
W
el
fa
re
 
C
o
st
Nominal Interest Rate
Compensation variation
approach_semi-log model
Consumer's surplus approach_semi-
log model
Compensation variation
approach_log-log model
Consumer's surplus approach_log-log
model
 Welfare Cost of Inflation  87 
 
 
Table 4 
ARDL Results for M1 
No. of Optimal Lags  Semi-log Demand Function Double-log Demand Function 
Panel A: F-statistics for Testing the Existence of Long-run Relationship 
3 24.018*** 19.311*** 
Panel B: Long-run Coefficients  
Regressor Coefficient Coefficient 
  Constant  –1.013*** –0.844*** 
  Interest rate  –0.031*** –0.208*** 
   


 
0.785 0.744 
DW-statistic  2.011 2.019 
F-statistic 24.018*** 19.311*** 
Panel C: Diagnostic Tests  
χ2SC(1)     0.027[0.869] 0.081[0.776] 
χ2FF(1)     0.049[0.823] 4.598[0.032] 
χ2N(2)    1.090[0.296] 0.245[0.884] 
χ2Het(1)    0.008[0.996] 1.122[0.289] 
CUSUM 0.334[0.564] 0.310[0.537] 
CUSUMSQ 0.534[0.634] 0.213[0.876] 
Notes: Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Pesaran, et al. (2001) Table F in Appendix C, Case 
III: unrestricted intercept and no trend for k=1, at 1 percent level of significance lower bound = 6.84 and 
upper bound = 7.84, at 5 percent level of significance lower bound = 4.94 and upper bound = 5.73.  
The Lagrange Multiplier statistics χ2SC(1),χ2FF(1), χ2Het(1), and χ2N(2)with degrees of freedom in parentheses 
are the tests for serial correlation, functional form mis-specification, Heteroscedasticity, and Normality, 
respectively.  
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are the tests for testing the null hypothesis of no structure break, i.e., the 
estimated coefficients are the same in every period. 
 
estimated. The estimated F-statistic indicates that there is a level relationship 
(cointegration) between the variables for both semi- and log-log models. The long-run 
coefficients of money demand function given in Panel B of Table 4 have theoretically 
correct signs and are statistically significant. The interest rate semi-elasticity of M1/GDP 
ratio is –3.172, the interest rate elasticity of money demand from log-log model is –0.208. 
Both models generally satisfy all diagnostic tests.  
 
5.3.2. Calculating Welfare Cost of Inflation for M1 
The estimated welfare costs of inflation for both semi-log and log-log models of 
M1 are presented in Table 5. Specifically, column 2 of the table gives the value of 
welfare loss against different nominal interest rates based on the compensating variation 
approach. The  welfare loss of 3 percent inflation corresponding to 5 percent nominal rate 
of interest is 0.21 percent of GDP against zero interest rate, while it reduces to 0.17 
percent against price stability. The welfare loss associated with the inflation rate of 7 
percent is 0.64 percent of income compared to a zero inflation rate, while reducing  
inflation further to deflation rate results in additional gain of 0.03 percent of GDP or total 
gain of 0.67 percent of GDP. It should be noted that the welfare cost of inflation 
associated with higher interest rates/inflation rates is substantially high than the welfare 
cost at lower inflation rates. It should also be noted that the welfare cost of inflation 
based on the compensation variation approach is higher than the welfare cost of inflation 
based on the consumer’s surplus approach through the range of interest rates used in the 
estimation. However, the difference is more profound at higher interest rates.    
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Table 5 
The Welfare Cost of Inflation for M1 
 
Semi-log Model Double-log Model 
Interest Rate 
Compensation 
Variation 
Approach 
Consumer’s 
Surplus 
Approach 
Compensation 
Variation 
Approach 
Consumer’s 
Surplus 
Approach 
0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.01 0.008 0.005 0.113 0.113 
0.02 0.033 0.022 0.197 0.196 
0.03 0.074 0.048 0.272 0.270 
0.04 0.133 0.084 0.342 0.339 
0.05 0.208 0.129 0.409 0.405 
0.06 0.299 0.182 0.473 0.468 
0.07 0.408 0.243 0.536 0.529 
0.08 0.532 0.311 0.596 0.588 
0.09 0.674 0.386 0.656 0.645 
0.10 0.832 0.467 0.714 0.701 
0.20 3.330 1.526 1.251 1.214 
0.30 7.493 2.820 1.744 1.673 
0.40 13.326 4.144 2.214 2.101 
0.50 20.810 5.386 2.669 2.506 
0.60 29.976 6.492 3.115 2.895 
0.70 40.794 7.444 3.555 3.271 
0.80 53.284 8.245 3.990 3.635 
0.90 67.446 8.906 4.423 3.990 
1.00 83.260 9.445 4.854 4.337 
For Semi-log Model 
Compensation variation approach: w(i) = 0.8326i2 
Consumer’s surplus approach: ( )[ ]ieWC 1718.3111145.0 1718.3 +−=  
For Double log Model 
Compensation variation approach: [ ] 11643.01)( 2641.07911.0 1 −−= −tiiw
 
Consumer’s surplus approach: 7911.08060.12640.0 ieWC −=  
 
Specifically, we observe that the welfare loss as a proportion of GDP based on the 
consumer’s surplus approach rises from 0.02 percent when the rate of interest is 2 percent 
(inflation rate is zero) to over 0.38 percent at a rate of interest of 9 percent. The  difference 
between these two welfare costs (0.38-0.02 = 0.36) gives the welfare loss of 7 percent 
inflation rate against zero inflation.  The welfare cost of 3 percent inflation is 0.13 percent of 
income and moving to zero interest rate yields welfare gain of 0.02 percent of GDP. 
By comparing the welfare cost of inflation under both semi-log and log-log models 
for M1, we find that welfare cost from semi long money demand function gives higher cost 
for higher interest. This holds regardless of whether the welfare cost is estimated by using 
the compensation variation approach or the  consumer’s surplus approach. Further, the 
estimated welfare cost based on the double log money demand indicates that both the 
approaches give almost the same measure of welfare loss by deviating from the deflation 
rule. The welfare gain of moving from higher to lower nominal interest rate is almost the 
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same for the log-log model but for the semi-log model the welfare gain is associated with 
the rate of interest. Under the semi-log model, a 1 percent decrease in nominal interest rate, 
for higher interest rate, results in more benefit compared to one percent decrease in nominal 
interest rate at the lower end of the curve. The welfare costs are plotted in Figure 3.   
 
Fig. 3.  The Welfare Cost of Inflation for M1
 
 
As in Wolman (1997) we are interested in the apportionment of the total gain of 
moving form a positive interest rate to the deflation rate. This gain has two parts; the first gain 
comes in moving from a positive nominal interest rate to price stability and the second from 
moving from zero inflation to the deflation policy. Owing to the sensitivity of the demand 
curves to low interest rates we find that, for the semi-log model, larger benefit accrues as the 
economy moves towards zero inflation; but further moving to deflation rate has a very small 
gain. Figure 2 shows that for semi-log money demand function under consumer surplus, the 
welfare gain of moving from 12 percent interest rate to deflation rate is equal to 0.64 percent 
of GDP, while for the double log the gain is 0.81 percent of the income. The proportion of 
gain from moving from zero inflation to deflation is only 5.15 percent of the total gain for the 
semi-log model and, for the double log, it is 24.2 percent.  
The difference between the estimates of welfare loss is reduced when the cost is 
measured relative to zero inflation nominal interest rate. For the present study the end of 
period real interest rate is 2 percent which, under price stability, is equivalent to  nominal 
interest rate. As shown in Figure 3 the welfare cost of non-optimal policy with a positive 
inflation rate has the same welfare loss under the three cases; the semi-log model with 
compensating variation and traditional approaches and the double-log model with the 
consumer surplus approach.14 The gain of moving from 12 percent interest rate to stable prices 
ranges from 0.61 to 0.63 percent of the income. For both the money demand specifications for 
M1, the welfare loss is almost the same for low and moderate inflation rates. The welfare loss 
line drawn for the double log model under the compensating variation approach diverges from 
the rest of the three cases as interest rate rises above 10 percent.  
 
14Lucas (2000) showed that the welfare gain of moving towards price stability is same for both the log-
log and semi-log versions. 
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5.4.  Estimation of Demand Function and Calculation of Welfare Cost of Inflation 
for Currency-Deposit Model 
 
5.4.1.  Estimating Demand Function for Currency-Deposit Model 
After estimating the demand function and the welfare costs for the single money 
stocks, M0 and M1 we estimate the welfare loss for the Currency-Deposit Model. We 
disintegrate the two components of M1 for the reason that both currency and demand 
deposits do not have the same opportunity cost. Hand-to-hand used currency offers no 
return; its opportunity cost is the yield on other financial assets, while the banking system 
offers interest rate on the demand deposits, the opportunity cost of holding demand 
deposits is the difference between the yield on alternative assets and the return on 
deposits. This difference requires that both currency and demand deposit functions should 
be estimated separately with their own opportunity costs. This also requires some 
modification in the welfare cost formulae. We apply the ARDL approach on bivariate 
models separately for currency and demand deposits using both semi-log and log-log 
specifications. The optimal lag selected based on the AIC and SBC is one for all the four 
models. The results are given in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 
ARDL Results for Currency-deposit Model 
 Semi-log Demand Function Double log Demand Function 
No. of Optimal Lags  Currency Demand Deposit Currency Demand Deposit 
Panel A: F-statistics for Testing the Existence of Long-run Relationship 
1 149.347*** 24.793*** 53.921*** 23.629*** 
Panel B: Long-run Coefficients 
Regressor Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  Constant  –1.576*** –2.083*** –1.340*** –2.088*** 
  Interest rate  –0.063*** –0.045** –0.037** –0.151* 
  Trend   0.016***  0.015*** 
  
2R  0.906 0.674 0.903 0.663 
  DW-statistic  1.640 1.871 1.549 1.737 
  F-statistic 149.347*** 24.793*** 144.860*** 23.629*** 
Panel C: Diagnostic Tests 
  χ2SC(1)     1.563[0.211] 0.051[0.821] 2.477[0.116] 1.001[0.317] 
  χ2FF(1)     0.343[0.558] 0.431[0.511] 0.206[0.649] 0.754[0.385] 
  χ2N(2)    3.893[0.143]
 
0.311[0.856] 5.695[0.058] 0.217[0.897] 
  χ2Het(1)    0.262[0.608] 0.647[0.421] 0.069[0.791] 0.553[0.457] 
  CUSUM 0.390[0.569] 0.324[0.613] 0.276[0.893] 0.253[0.756] 
  CUSUMSQ 0.232[0.834] 0.278[0.819] 0.347[0.759] 0.263[0.659] 
Notes: Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Pesaran, et al. (2001) Table F in Appendix C, Case 
III: unrestricted intercept and no trend for k=1, at 1 percent level of significance lower bound = 6.84 and 
upper bound = 7.84, at 5 percent level of significance lower bound = 4.94 and upper bound = 5.73.  
Case V: intercept and trend for k=1, at 1 percent level of significance lower bound = 8.74 and upper 
bound = 9.63, at 5 percent level of significance lower bound = 6.56 and upper bound = 7.30. 
The Lagrange Multiplier statistics χ2SC(1),χ2FF(1), χ2Het(1), and χ2N(2) with degrees of freedom in parentheses 
are test for serial correlation, functional form mis-specification, Heteroscedasticity, and Normality, 
respectively. 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are the tests for testing the null hypothesis of no structure break, i.e., the 
estimated coefficients are the same in every period.  
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The results indicate the existence of long-run relationship for both currency and 
demand deposits demand functions regardless of whether the model is estimated in semi-
log or the  log-log form. The long-run coefficients from all four models are reported in 
Panel B of the table. The lower panel of the table shows that the estimated models do not 
have  a  serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and that the regression passes the functional 
form mis-specification and the normality tests.  
The semi-elasticity of currency-to-GDP ratio is –6.36 which is higher than for any 
other money stock. On the other hand, the corresponding figure with respect to deposit 
rate for demand deposits is –4.5. From the log-log specification, the interest rate elasticity 
is –0.037 and –0.151 for currency-to-GDP ratio and demand deposits, respectively.  
 
5.4.2.  Calculating Welfare Cost of Inflation for Currency-Demand Model 
Using the estimates given in Table 6, we calculate the welfare costs of inflation for 
unrestricted and restricted models. The results are presented in Table 7. As one can see 
from column (2) of the table, the welfare gain of moving from 9 percent nominal interest  
 
Table 7 
The Welfare Cost of Inflation for Currency-demand Model 
 
Semi-log Model Double log Model 
 Compensation Variation  
Approach 
Consumer’s Surplus  
Approach 
Calibration  Consumer’s Surplus 
Approach 
Interest 
Rate 
Restricted 
Model 
Unrestricted 
Model 
Restricted 
Model 
Unrestricted 
Model 
Double Log 
Model 
Restricted  
Model 
0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.01 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.056 0.074 
0.02 0.016 0.027 0.016 0.024 0.102 0.134 
0.03 0.036 0.060 0.035 0.052 0.143 0.188 
0.04 0.065 0.108 0.061 0.089 0.183 0.240 
0.05 0.102 0.168 0.093 0.134 0.221 0.290 
0.06 0.147 0.243 0.130 0.185 0.258 0.338 
0.07 0.200 0.331 0.172 0.242 0.295 0.385 
0.08 0.261 0.432 0.218 0.304 0.330 0.431 
0.09 0.331 0.547 0.268 0.370 0.365 0.475 
0.10 0.408 0.675 0.322 0.439 0.399 0.520 
0.20 1.634 2.702 0.973 1.196 0.724 0.932 
0.30 3.677 6.079 1.677 1.881 1.029 1.311 
0.40 6.537 10.808 2.315 2.403 1.324 1.670 
0.50 10.215 16.887 2.848 2.772 1.612 2.016 
0.60 14.709 24.318 3.274 3.027 1.897 2.350 
0.70 20.021 33.099 3.607 3.203 2.180 2.676 
0.80 26.150 43.232 3.865 3.329 2.461 2.995 
0.90 33.096 54.715 4.066 3.424 2.742 3.307 
1.00 40.860 67.550 4.225 3.501 3.023 3.614 
For Semi-log Model 
Compensation variation approach 
Restricted model: w(i) = 0.4086i2 
Unrestricted model: w(i) = 0.6755i2 
Consumer’s surplus approach:  
Restricted model: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ieieWC ii 5537.0110274.052.41104184.0 5537.052.4 +−++−= −−  
Unrestricted model: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ieieWC ii 5537.0110274.036.6110325.0 5537.036.6 +−++−= −−  
 
For Double-log Model 
Calibration: ( ) 115432.01)( 1777.084913.0 −



−=
−
tiiw
 
Consumer’s surplus approach: 84193.003614.0 iWC =  
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rate to zero inflation (2 percent nominal interest rate) is 0.48 percent of GDP and further 
moving to deflation rate results in additional gain of 0.18 percent of GDP. Based on  
Bailey’s approach, a 10 percent inflation costs the equivalent of a reduction of output by 
0.38 percent. Under the log-log currency-deposit model, the gain in moving from price 
stability to Friedman’s optimal rule of deflation is 0.13 percent of GDP. The welfare 
estimates based on both the consumers’ surplus and the compensating variation approach 
tend to give similar costs of inflation.   
After estimating the money demand functions and calculating the welfare cost for 
the three models we draw the following conclusions regarding the welfare cost and its 
sensitivity to the selection of money demand function, approaches to calculate welfare 
loss and the definition of money.
 
(i) By comparing the two approaches to measure the welfare loss we find that 
across all monetary assets under semi-log model, Lucas’ quadratic formula 
gives bigger values of the loss function for higher interest rates. On the 
other hand, for double log model, the two approaches give approximately 
the same loss in welfare.  
(ii) The welfare cost of inflation is sensitive to the money demand 
specification. For all the monetary aggregates the welfare gain of moving 
from price stability to zero interest rate under double log model ranges from 
0.10 percent to 0.25 percent of GDP, while for semi-log model the gain is 
trivial and ranges from 0.01 percent to 0.03 percent of GDP.  
(iii) The Bailey and Lucas welfare cost formulae are based on the elasticity and 
semi-elasticity of money demand function. The  long-run estimates of both 
the semi log and double log models show that for all the four money stocks 
the elasticities and semi-elasticities are different.  
(iv) Comparing M1 and the Currency-Deposit model which calculates welfare 
loss based on different opportunity costs of the constituents of M1, we find 
that the welfare cost for currency-deposit model is less than the loss 
measured using M1. These findings are in line with the empirical literature 
on welfare cost, that, as currency and deposits are lumped together in M1 
and the cost evaluated at the same market rate of interest for both currency 
and demand deposits (treating deposits as non-interest bearing asset), it 
exaggerates the true cost.15 
(v) The welfare cost of inflation is sizable for Pakistan in comparison to the 
developed countries. The welfare gain of moving from 14 percent to 3 
percent nominal interest rate is 0.65 percent of GDP, which is greater than 
the estimated gains for the US, Canada and the European countries (for 
double log specification using the Lucas compensating variation 
approach).16 Similarly the cost computed from semi-log model and using 
the consumer surplus approach yields welfare loss of 0.06 percent and 0.62 
percent of GDP as moving from 2 percent and 10 percent inflation rates to 
 
15Distinct role of currency and deposits is emphasised in Marty (1999), Bali (2000), and Simonsen and 
Rubens (2001). 
16See Serletis and Yavari (2003, 2005, 2007). 
 Welfare Cost of Inflation  93 
 
 
price stability. This cost is greater than computed for the US which ranges 
from 0.04 to 0.21 percent of income under similar settings.17 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we quantified the welfare cost of inflation from the estimated long-
run money demand functions for Pakistan for the period 1960-2007. The demand 
functions for four monetary aggregates—monetary base, narrow money (M1), currency 
and demand deposits—taken as a ratio to income against their respective opportunity 
costs, are estimated. The welfare cost of inflation calculated for constant interest 
elasticity specification is compared to the constant semi-elasticity specification for two 
types of monetary asset models. For the single monetary asset model, money stock is 
defined as monetary base and narrow money M1, while in the currency-deposit model 
M1 is disintegrated into currency and deposits based on the return on each of its 
constituent components. In calculating the welfare loss we have employed the traditional 
approach proposed by Bailey (1956) where loss due to inflation is measured by area 
under the money demand curve and the Lucas (2000) compensating variation approach.  
The empirical results show that all the monetary aggregates are negatively related 
to the interest rate. The welfare gain of moving from positive inflation to zero inflation is 
approximately the same under both money demand specifications, but the behaviour of 
the two models is different towards low interest rates. Moving from zero inflation to zero 
nominal interest rate has substantial gain under the log-log form compared to the semi-
log function. The compensating variation approach for the semi-log model gives higher 
welfare loss figures compared to Bailey’s approach due to the quadratic nature of 
nominal interest rate in the Lucas (2000) welfare measure. However, the two approaches 
yield approximately similar welfare costs of inflation for the log-log specification.   
The findings of this study suggest that the society bears a substantial loss due to 
inflation and a positive nominal interest rate. This is the first attempt to break new 
grounds for measuring the welfare cost of inflation for Pakistan. However, the limitation 
of this study is that the welfare cost analysis is based on the direct cost of inflation, not 
addressing other channels through which inflation results in inefficient allocation of 
resources. The direct cost of inflation understates the actual cost of inflation, as inflation 
tends to distort marginal decisions by altering the work-leisure choice and interact with 
the tax structure of the economy. The actual cost of inflation is much greater than  
estimated in this study. The State Bank of Pakistan should opt for an independent 
monetary policy. For the last two years the government has financed its expenditures by 
borrowing heavily from the SBP against the bank’s tight monetary policy and passed on 
the rising inflation to the economy. Furthermore, the Taylor Principle-driven rising 
nominal interest rate contributes to inflation through the cost side. The best policy 
contribution to sustain growth and welfare will be to maintain price stability.  
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